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// SMART CONTRACT SECURITY AUDIT

MobileCoin

Security assessment by HashEye · prepared for MobileCoin

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MobileCoin Confidential Tokens Security Assessment August 3, 2022 Prepared for: Sara Drakeley MobileCoin Prepared by:Samuel Moelius and Jaime Iglesias

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 Test Coverage Disclaimer All activities undertaken by HashEye in association with this project were performed in accordance with a statement of work and agreed upon project plan. Security assessment projects are time-boxed and often reliant on information that may be provided by a client, its affiliates, or its partners. As a result, the findings documented in this report should not be considered a comprehensive list of security issues, flaws, or defects in the target system or codebase. HashEye uses automated testing techniques to rapidly test the controls and security properties of software. These techniques augment our manual security review work, but each has its limitations: for example, a tool may not generate a random edge case that violates a property or may not fully complete its analysis during the allotted time. Their use is also limited by the time and resource constraints of a project. HashEye 2MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

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Executive Summary Engagement Overview MobileCoin engaged HashEye to review the security of its confidential tokens feature. From July 11 to July 15, 2022, a team of two consultants conducted a security review of the client-provided source code, with two person-weeks of effort. Details of the project's timeline, test targets, and coverage are provided in subsequent sections of this report. Project Scope Our testing efforts were focused on the identification of flaws that could result in a compromise of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the target system. We conducted this audit with full knowledge of the target system, including access to the source code and documentation. We performed static and manual analysis of the target system. Summary of Findings The audit uncovered only minor flaws that could impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability. A summary of the findings is provided below. EXPOSURE ANALYSIS SeverityCount High0 Medium1 Low1 Informational4 Undetermined1 CATEGORY BREAKDOWN CategoryCount Access Controls1

Authentication1 Data Exposure2 Denial of Service2 Patching1 HashEye 4MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Project Summary Contact Information The following managers were associated with this project: Dan Guido, Account ManagerMary O'Brien, Project Manager dan@hasheye.iomary.obrien@hasheye.io The following engineers were associated with this project: Samuel Moelius, ConsultantJaime Iglesias, Consultant samuel.moelius@hasheye.iojaime.iglesias@hasheye.io Project Timeline The significant events and milestones of the project are listed below. DateEvent June 3, 2022Architecture discussion July 7, 2022Pre-project kickoff call July 18, 2022Delivery of report draft July 18, 2022Report readout meeting July 19, 2022Delivery of corrections to errors identifiedduring readout August 3, 2022Delivery of final report HashEye 5MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Project Goals The engagement was scoped to provide a security assessment of the MobileCoin confidential tokens feature. Specifically, we sought to answer the following non-exhaustive list of questions: • Does the confidential tokens feature introduce runaway minting bugs? • Does the confidential tokens feature introduce double spending bugs? • Are there any ways in which token IDs could be revealed? • Are there any ways in which funds could be lost? • Could burned tokens be spent? • For mint transactions, is the chain of trust from the trusted root checked correctly? • Are the token-specific generators calculated in constant time? • Are mint and mint configuration nonces handled correctly? • Are transaction priorities properly computed? • Are token fees computed and paid correctly? HashEye 6MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Project Targets The engagement involved a review and testing of the following target. MobileCoin Repositoryhttps://github.com/mobilecoinfoundation/mobilecoin Version 196ca2eb14a3c4f377e8e471f80070dafde40f4a (tagv1.2.1) 06e09b3e0ffac7f8b6845c9e09bfe992f72a5f59 (pull/2215) Directories transaction/* consensus/enclave/* consensus/service/* crypto/digestible/* (not reviewed) crypto/multisig/* (not reviewed) account-keys/src/burn_address.rs (not reviewed) consensus/mint-client/* (not reviewed) mint-auditor/* (not reviewed) TypeRust PlatformIntel SGX HashEye 7MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Project Coverage This section provides an overview of the analysis coverage of the review, as determined by our high-level engagement goals. Our approaches and their results include the following: • Review of the MobileCoin Improvement Proposals (MCIPs) and white paper ○ We reviewed the provided documentation both to understand the implemented features and to look for potential shortfalls in the specification. • Static analysis with cargo-audit and Clippy ○ We ran cargo-audit over all of the lockfiles and Clippywith -W clippy::pedantic enabled. We reviewed the resultsof each. • Review of test coverage ○ We ran the tests normally, inrandom order, and with AddressSanitizer enabled. We also computed the tests' code coverage using cargo-llvm-cov and looked for gaps in the code related to the confidential tokens feature. • Manual review ○ We manually reviewed the contents of the transaction , consensus/enclave , and consensus/service directories,with a focus on changes relevant to the confidential tokens feature. Coverage Limitations Because of the time-boxed nature of testing work, it is common to encounter coverage limitations. The following list outlines the coverage limitations of the engagement and indicates system elements that may warrant further review: • Due to time constraints, the following directories, while in scope, were not reviewed: ○ crypto/digestible/* ○ crypto/multisig/* ○ account-keys/src/burn_address.rs ○ consensus/mint-client/* ○ mint-auditor/* HashEye 8MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

• Our automated analysis efforts were limited to static analysis via cargo-audit and Clippy and to running the tests (under various configurations). In particular, we performed no fuzzing. • We used only a manual review to check that operations are performed in constant time. A more thorough approach would involve a trace analysis, similar to what we did for the MobileCoin Fog assessment. HashEye 9MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Codebase Maturity Evaluation HashEye uses a traffic-light protocol to provide each client with a clear understanding of the areas in which its codebase is mature, immature, or underdeveloped. Deficiencies identified here often stem from root causes within the software development life cycle that should be addressed through standardization measures (e.g., the use of common libraries, functions, or frameworks) or training and awareness programs. CategorySummaryResult ArithmeticWe identified one problem related to arithmetic that could allow token IDs to be revealed (TOB-MCCT-7). Moderate AuditingWe were unable to review code related to auditing of minting and burning operations. Further Investigation Required Authentication / Access Controls We found no significant issues regarding authentication or access controls. Satisfactory Complexity Management The use of MCIPs demonstrates a disciplined development process. However, we found one issue related to the project's dependency management (TOB-MCCT-1). Moderate Cryptography and Key Management We identified no problems related to cryptography or key management. However, we were unable to review the relevant parts of the crypto directory. Further Investigation Required DecentralizationMinting

and token governance are centrally controlled. All minting configurations must chain back to a centrally controlled MINTING_TRUST_ROOT_PRIVATE_KEY . Moderate DocumentationThe MCIPs and “Confidential Tokens” white paper exceed industry standards regarding documentation. We recommend that this standard be maintained. However, we recommend adding diagrams to help users better Strong HashEye 10MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

understand the codebase and the architecture. Front-Running Resistance We found no problems related to front-running.Satisfactory Low-Level Manipulation Cryptographic code and code required to run in constant time require further review. Further Investigation Required Testing and Verification Code that changed because of the introduction of the confidential tokens feature appears to be adequately tested. Satisfactory HashEye 11MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Summary of Findings The table below summarizes the findings of the review, including type and severity details. IDTitleTypeSeverity 1Project contains vulnerable dependenciesPatchingUndetermined 2MobileCoin Foundation could infer token IDs in certain scenarios Data ExposureInformational 3Token IDs are protected only by SGXAccess ControlsInformational 4Nonces are not stored per tokenDenial of ServiceLow 5Clients have no option for verifying blockchain configuration AuthenticationInformational 6Confidential tokens cannot support frequent price swings Denial of ServiceInformational 7Overflow handling could allow recovery of transaction token ID Data ExposureMedium HashEye 12MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Detailed Findings 1. Project contains vulnerable dependencies Severity:UndeterminedDifficulty:High Type: PatchingFinding ID: TOB-MCCT-1 Target: Various Description Running cargo-audit over the codebase revealed thatthe system under audit uses crates with Rust Security (RustSec) advisories and crates that are no longer maintained. RustSec IDDescriptionDependencyCVSS Score 2022-0006Data race in Iter and IterMutthread_local1.0.1 N/A 2020-0071Potential segfault in the time crate time0.1.43 Medium 2021-0003Buffer overflow in SmallVec::insert_many smallvec1.2.0 Critical 2022-0013Regexes with large repetitions on empty sub-expressions take a very long time to parse regex1.3.0 High 2020-0036 failure is officially deprecated/unmaintained failure0.1.8 Critical 2018-0017 tempdir has been deprecated; use tempfile instead tempdir0.3.7 N/A Figure 1.1: cargo-audit results Exploit Scenario Eve discovers a code path leading to a vulnerable crate and uses the code path to conduct exploits such as crashing nodes and corrupting memory. Recommendations Short term,update the vulnerable dependencies tosafe versions and use alternatives to the unmaintained/deprecated ones. HashEye 13MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Long term,regularly run cargo-audit over the codebase. Doing so can help reveal similar bugs. Additionally, consider integrating cargo-audit into the CI/CD pipeline. References • cargo-audit HashEye 14MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

2. MobileCoin Foundation could infer token IDs in certain scenarios Severity:InformationalDifficulty:High Type: Data ExposureFinding ID: TOB-MCCT-2 Target: Various Description The MobileCoin Foundation is the recipient of all transaction fees and, in certain scenarios, could infer the token ID used in one of multiple transactions included in a block. MCIP-0025introduced the concept of “confidentialtoken IDs.” The rationale behind the proposal is to allow the MobileCoin network to support tokens other than MOB (MobileCoin’s native token) in the future. Doing so requires not only that these tokens be unequivocally identifiable but also that transactions involving any token, MOB or otherwise, have the same confidentiality properties. Before the introduction of the confidential tokens feature, all transaction fees were aggregated by the enclave, which created a single transaction fee output per block; however, the same approach applied to a system that supports transfers of tokens other than MOB could introduce information leakage risks. For example, if two users submit two transactions with the same token ID, there would be a single transaction fee output, and therefore, both users would know that they transacted with the same token. To prevent such a leak of information, MCIP-0025 proposes the following: The number of transaction fee outputs on a block should always equal the minimum value between the number of token IDs and the number of transactions in that block (e.g., num_tx_fee_out=min(num_token_ids,num_transactions)).This essentially means that a block with a single transaction will still have a single transaction fee output, but a block with multiple transactions with the same token ID will have multiple transaction fee outputs, one with the aggregated fee and the others with a zero-value fee. Finally, it is worth mentioning that transaction fees are not paid in MOB but in the token that is being transacted; this creates a better user experience, as users do not need to own MOB to send tokens to other people. While this proposal does indeed preserve the confidentiality requirement, it falls short in one respect: the receiver of all transaction fees in the MobileCoin network is the MobileCoin Foundation, meaning that it will always know the token ID corresponding to a transaction fee output. Therefore, if only a single token is used in a block, the foundation will know the token ID used by all of the transactions in that block. HashEye 15MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Exploit Scenario Alice and Bob use the MobileCoin network to make payments between them. They send each other multiple payments, using the same token, and their transactions are included in a single block. Eve, who has access to the MobileCoin Foundation's viewing key, is able to decrypt the transaction fee outputs corresponding to that block and, because no other token was used inside the block, is able to infer the token that Alice and Bob used to make the payments. Recommendations Short term, document the fact that transaction token IDs are visible to the MobileCoin Foundation. Transparency on this issue will help users understand the information that is visible by some parties. Additionally, consider implementing the following alternative designs: • Require that all transaction fees be paid in MOB. This solution would result in a degraded user experience compared to the current design; however, it would address the issue at hand. • Aggregate fee outputs across multiple blocks. This solution would achieve only "probabilistic confidentiality" of information because if all those blocks transact in the same token, the foundation would still be able to infer the ID. Long term, document the trade-offs between allowing users to pay fees in the tokens they transact with and restricting fee payments to only MOB, and document how these trade-offs could affect the confidentiality of the system. HashEye 16MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

3. Token IDs are protected only by SGX Severity:InformationalDifficulty:High Type: Access ControlsFinding ID: TOB-MCCT-3 Target: consensus/enclave/impl/src/lib.rs Description Token IDs are intended to be confidential. However, they are operated on within an SGX enclave. This is an apparent departure from MobileCoin's previous approach of using SGX as an additional security mechanism, not a primary one. Previously, most confidential information in MobileCoin was protected by SGXand another security mechanism. Examples include the following: • A transactions' senders, recipients, and amounts are protected by SGX and ring signatures. • The transactions a user interacts with through Fog are protected by both SGX and oblivious RAM. However, token IDs are protected by SGX alone. (An example in which a token ID is operated on within an enclave appears in figure 3.1.) Thus, the incorporation of confidential tokens seems to represent a shift in MobileCoin's security posture. lettoken_id=TokenId::from(tx.prefix.fee_token_id); letminimum_fee=ct_min_fees .get(&token_id) .ok_or(TransactionValidationError::TokenNotYetConfigured)?; Figure 3.1: consensus/enclave/impl/src/lib.rs#L239-L243 Exploit Scenario Mallory learns of a vulnerability that allows her to see inside of an SGX enclave. Mallory uses the vulnerability to observe the token IDs used in transactions in a MobileCoin enclave that she runs. Recommendations Short term, document the fact that token IDs are not offered the same level of security as other aspects of MobileCoin. This will help set users' expectations regarding the confidentiality of their information (i.e., whether it could be revealed to an attacker). HashEye 17MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Long term, continue to investigate solutions to the security problems surrounding the confidential tokens feature. A solution that does not reveal token IDs to the enclave could exist. HashEye 18MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

4. Nonces are not stored per token Severity:LowDifficulty:High Type: Denial of ServiceFinding ID: TOB-MCCT-4 Target: Various Description Mint and mint configuration transaction nonces are not distinguished by the tokens with which they are associated. Malicious minters or governors could use this fact to conduct denial-of-service attacks against other minters and governors. The relevant code appears in figures 4.1 and 4.2. For each type of transaction, nonces are inserted into a seen_nonces set without regard tothe token indicated in the transaction. letmutseen_nonces=BTreeSet::default(); letmutvalidated_txs=Vec::with_capacity(mint_config_txs.len()); fortxinmint_config_txs{ // Ensure all nonces are unique. if!seen_nonces.insert(tx.prefix.nonce.clone()){ returnErr(Error::FormBlock(format!("Duplicate MintConfigTx nonce:{:?}", tx.prefix.nonce))); } Figure 4.1: consensus/enclave/impl/src/lib.rs#L342-L352 letmutmint_txs=Vec::with_capacity(mint_txs_with_config.len()); letmutseen_nonces=BTreeSet::default(); for(mint_tx,mint_config_tx,mint_config)inmint_txs_with_config{ // The nonce should be unique. if!seen_nonces.insert(mint_tx.prefix.nonce.clone()){ returnErr(Error::FormBlock(format!("Duplicate MintTx nonce:{:?}", mint_tx.prefix.nonce))); } Figure 4.2: consensus/enclave/impl/src/lib.rs#L384-L393 Note that the described attack could be made worse by how nonces are intended to be used. The following passage from the white paper suggests that nonces are generated HashEye 19MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

deterministically from public data. Generating nonces in this way could make them easy for an attacker to predict. When submitting a MintTx, we include a nonce to protect against replay attacks, and a tombstone block to prevent the transaction from being nominated indefinitely, and these are committed to the chain. (For example, in a bridge application, this nonce may be derived from records on the source chain, to ensure that each deposit on the source chain leads to at most one mint.) Exploit Scenario Mallory (a minter) learns that Alice (another minter) intends to submit

a mint transaction with a particular nonce. Mallory submits a mint transaction with that nonce first, making Alice's invalid. Recommendations Short term, store nonces per token, instead of all together. Doing so will prevent the denial-of-service attack described above. Long term, when adding new data to blocks or to the blockchain configuration, carefully consider whether it should be stored per token. Doing so could help to prevent denial-of-service attacks. HashEye 20MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

5. Clients have no option for verifying blockchain configuration Severity:InformationalDifficulty:High Type: AuthenticationFinding ID: TOB-MCCT-5 Target: Various Description Clients have no way to verify whether the MobileCoin node they connect to is using the correct blockchain configuration. This exposes users to attacks, as detailed in the white paper: Similarly to how the nodes ensure that they are similarly configured during attestation, (by mixing a hash of their configuration into the responder id used during attestation), the peer- to-node attestation channels could also do this, so that users can fail to attest immediately if malicious manipulation of configuration has occurred. The problem with this approach is that the users have no particularly good source of truth around the correct runtime configuration of the services. The problem that "users have no particularly good source of truth" could be solved by publishing the latest blockchain configuration via a separate channel (e.g., a publicly accessible server). Furthermore, allowing users to opt in to such additional checks would provide additional security to users who desire it. Exploit Scenario Alice falls victim to the attack described in the white paper. The attack would have been thwarted had Alice known that the node she connected to was not using the correct blockchain configuration. Recommendations Short term, make the current blockchain configuration publicly available, and allow nodes to attest to clients using their configuration. Doing so will help security-conscious users to better protect themselves. Long term, avoid withholding data from clients during attestation. Adopt a general principle that if data should be included in node-to-node attestation, then it should be included in node-to-client attestation as well. Doing so will help to ensure the security of users. HashEye 21MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

6. Confidential tokens cannot support frequent price swings Severity:InformationalDifficulty:High Type: Denial of ServiceFinding ID: TOB-MCCT-6 Target: Various Description The method for determining tokens' minimum fees has limited applicability. In particular, it cannot support tokens whose prices change frequently. In principle, a token's minimum fee should be comparable in value to the MOB minimum fee. Thus, if a token's price increases relative to the price of MOB, the token's minimum fee should decrease. Similarly, if a token's price decreases relative to the price of MOB, the token's minimum fee should increase. However, an enclave sets its fee map from the blockchain configuration during initialization (figure 6.1) and does not change the fee map thereafter. Thus, the enclave would seem to have to be restarted if its blockchain configuration and fee map were to change. This fact implies that the current setup cannot support tokens whose prices shift frequently. fnenclave_init(&self, peer_self_id: &ResponderId, client_self_id: &ResponderId, sealed_key: &Option<SealedBlockSigningKey>, blockchain_config:BlockchainConfig,) ->Result<(SealedBlockSigningKey,Vec<String>)>{ // Check that fee map is actually well formed FeeMap::is_valid_map(blockchain_config.fee_map.as_ref()).map_err(Error::FeeMap)?; // Validate governors signature. if!blockchain_config.governors_map.is_empty(){ letsignature=blockchain_config .governors_signature .ok_or(Error::MissingGovernorsSignature)?; letminting_trust_root_public_key= Ed25519Public::try_from(&MINTING_TRUST_ROOT_PUBLIC_KEY[..]) .map_err(Error::ParseMintingTrustRootPublicKey)?; minting_trust_root_public_key .verify_governors_map(&blockchain_config.governors_map,&signature) HashEye 22MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

.map_err(|_|Error::InvalidGovernorsSignature)?; } self.ct_min_fee_map .set(Box::new(blockchain_config.fee_map.as_ref().iter().collect(),)) .expect("enclave was already initialized"); Figure 6.1: consensus/enclave/impl/src/lib.rs#L454-L483 Exploit Scenario MobileCoin integrates token T. The value of T decreases, but the minimum fee remains the same. Users pay the minimum fee, resulting in lost income to the MobileCoin Foundation. Recommendations Short term, accept only tokens with a history of price stability. Doing so will ensure that the new features are used only with tokens that can be supported. Long term, consider including two inputs in each transaction, one for the token transferred and one to pay the fee in MOB, as suggested inTOB-MCCT-2. HashEye 23MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

7. Overflow handling could allow recovery of transaction token ID Severity:MediumDifficulty:High Type: Data ExposureFinding ID: TOB-MCCT-7 Target: consensus/enclave/impl/src/lib.rs Description The system's fee calculation could overflow a u64 value. When this occurs, the fee is divided up into multiple smaller fees, each fitting into a u64 value. Under certain conditions, this behavior could be abused to reveal whether a token ID is used in a block. The relevant code appears in figure 7.1. The hypothetical attack is described in the exploit scenario below. loop{

letoutput_fee=min(total_fee,u64::MAXasu128)asu64; outputs.push(mint_output(config.block_version, &fee_recipient, FEES_OUTPUT_PRIVATE_KEY_DOMAIN_TAG.as_bytes(), parent_block, &transactions, Amount{ value:output_fee, token_id, }, outputs.len(),)); total_fee-=output_feeasu128; iftotal_fee==0{ break; } } Figure 7.1: consensus/enclave/impl/src/lib.rs#L855-L873 Exploit Scenario Mallory is a (malicious) minter of token T. Suppose B is a recently minted block whose total number of fee outputs is equal to the number of tokens, which is less than the number of transactions in B. Further suppose that Mallory wishes to determine whether B contains a transaction involving T. Mallory does the following: 1.She puts her node into its state just prior to the minting of B. HashEye 24MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

2.She mints to herself a quantity of T worth ⌊u64::MAX/min_fee⌋*min_fee . Call this quantity F. 3.She submits to her node a transaction with a fee of F. 4.She allows the block to be minted. 5.She observes the number of fee outputs in the modified block, B′: a.If B does not contain a transaction involving T, then B contains a fee output for T equal to zero, and B′ contains a fee output for T equal to F. b.If B does contain a transaction involving T, then B contains a fee output for T equal to at least min_fee , and B′ contains two feeoutputs for T, one of which is equal to u64::MAX . Thus, by observing the number of outputs in B′, Mallory can determine whether B contains a transaction involving T. Recommendations Short term, require the total supply of all incorporated tokens not to exceed a u64 value. Doing so will eliminate the possibility of overflow and prevent the attack described above. Long term, consider incorporating randomness into the number of fee outputs generated. This could provide an alternative means of preventing the attack in a way that still allows for overflow. Alternatively, consider including two inputs in each transaction, one for the token transferred and one to pay the fee in MOB, as suggested inTOB-MCCT-2. HashEye 25MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Summary of Recommendations HashEye recommends that MobileCoin address the findings detailed in this report and take the following additional steps prior to deployment: • Maintain the current industry-exceeding standard of documentation. • Conduct an audit of the directories that were not reviewed during this engagement. Include the ledger directory within the scope of thataudit. • Regularly run cargo-audit as part of the project’sCI process (TOB-MCCT-1). • Consider including two inputs in each transaction: one for the token transferred and one to pay the fee in MOB (TOB-MCCT-2,TOB-MCCT-6,TOB-MCCT-7). • Store nonces per token ID to remediateTOB-MCCT-4. • Require the total supply of all incorporated tokens not to exceed a u64 value (TOB-MCCT-7). HashEye 26MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

A. Vulnerability Categories The following tables describe the vulnerability categories, severity levels, and difficulty levels used in this document. Vulnerability Categories CategoryDescription Access ControlsInsufficient authorization or assessment of rights Auditing and LoggingInsufficient auditing of actions or logging of problems AuthenticationImproper identification of users ConfigurationMisconfigured servers, devices, or software components CryptographyA breach of system confidentiality or integrity Data ExposureExposure of sensitive information Data ValidationImproper reliance on the structure or values of data Denial of ServiceA system failure with an availability impact Error ReportingInsecure or insufficient reporting of error conditions PatchingUse of an outdated software package or library Session ManagementImproper identification of authenticated users TestingInsufficient test methodology or test coverage TimingRace conditions or other order-of-operations flaws Undefined BehaviorUndefined behavior triggered within the system HashEye 27MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Severity Levels SeverityDescription InformationalThe issue does not pose an immediate risk but is relevant to security best practices. UndeterminedThe extent of the risk was not determined during this engagement. LowThe risk is small or is not one the client has indicated is important. MediumUser information is at risk; exploitation could pose reputational, legal, or moderate financial risks. HighThe flaw could affect numerous users and have serious reputational, legal, or financial implications. Difficulty Levels DifficultyDescription UndeterminedThe difficulty of exploitation was not determined during this engagement. LowThe flaw is well known; public tools for its exploitation exist or can be scripted. MediumAn attacker must write an exploit or will need in-depth knowledge of the system. HighAn attacker must have privileged access to the system, may need to know complex technical details, or must discover other weaknesses to exploit this issue. HashEye 28MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

B. Code Maturity Categories The following tables describe the code maturity categories and rating criteria used in this document. Code Maturity Categories CategoryDescription ArithmeticThe proper use of mathematical operations and semantics AuditingThe use of event auditing and logging to support monitoring Authentication / Access Controls The use of robust access controls to handle identification and authorization and to ensure safe interactions with the system Complexity Management The presence of clear structures designed to manage system complexity, including the separation of system logic into clearly defined functions Cryptography and Key Management The safe

use of cryptographic primitives and functions, along with the presence of robust mechanisms for key generation and distribution DecentralizationThe presence of a decentralized governance structure for mitigating insider threats and managing risks posed by contract upgrades DocumentationThe presence of comprehensive and readable codebase documentation Front-Running Resistance The system’s resistance to front-running attacks Low-Level Manipulation The justified use of inline assembly and low-level calls Testing and Verification The presence of robust testing procedures (e.g., unit tests, integration tests, and verification methods) and sufficient test coverage HashEye 29MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

Rating Criteria RatingDescription StrongNo issues were found, and the system exceeds industry standards. SatisfactoryMinor issues were found, but the system is compliant with best practices. ModerateSome issues that may affect system safety were found. WeakMany issues that affect system safety were found. MissingA required component is missing, significantly affecting system safety. Not ApplicableThe category is not applicable to this review. Not ConsideredThe category was not considered in this review. Further Investigation Required Further investigation is required to reach a meaningful conclusion. HashEye 30MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

C. Non-Security-Related Findings The following recommendations are not associated with specific vulnerabilities. However, they enhance code readability and may prevent the introduction of vulnerabilities in the future. • We noticed the following typos: ○ In the second of the followingtwo lines, // shouldbe /// : /// Seed to use when generating blocks (e.g. //12345678123456781234567812345678123456781234567812345678). ○ In the followinglines, “origianl” should be “original”: returnErr(Error::InvalidMintConfig("MintConfigs do not matchorigianltransaction".to_string(),)); ○ In the followingline, there is an extra space before `C` : /// `view_public_key` - The user's public subaddress view key`C`, ○ In the followinglines, “maximal” could be “maximum.”The latter sounds more natural and is correct because the value is unique: /// Themaximalamount this configuration can mintfrom the moment it has /// been applied. • There is considerable code duplication between the definitions of add_output and add_change_output in transaction/std/src/transaction_builder.rs .We recommend that the functions’ definitions be consolidated: pubfnadd_output<RNG:CryptoRng+RngCore>(&mutself, value:u64, recipient: &PublicAddress, rng: &mutRNG,) →Result<TxOutContext,TxBuilderError> { // Taking self.memo_builder here means that we can call functions on &mut self, // and pass them something that has captured the memo builder. // Calling take() on Option<Box> is just moving a pointer. letmutmb=self .memo_builder .take() .expect("memo builder is missing, this is alogic error"); ... pubfnadd_change_output<RNG:CryptoRng+RngCore>(HashEye 31MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC

&mutself, value:u64, change_destination: &ChangeDestination, rng: &mutRNG,) ->Result<TxOutContext,TxBuilderError> { // Taking self.memo_builder here means that we can call functions on &mut self, // and pass them something that has captured the memo builder. // Calling take() on Option<Box> is just moving a pointer. letmutmb=self .memo_builder .take() .expect("memo builder is missing, this is alogic error"); ... HashEye 32MobileCoin Security Assessment PUBLIC